<p>Then South Vietnamese naval commandos raided a pair of islands laying in the Gulf of Tonkin. In response to the invasion of their territory, the North sent a small force of high-speed patrol torpedo boats into the Gulf and they intercepted the USS Maddox, an America destroyer. They barrelled in, attacked, and fled. Two nights later, they repeated the performance against the USS C. Turner Joy. That was the triggering action.
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<p>Within 12 hours, a retaliatory strike had been launched, sending USAF and Navy planes against port installations. The Rubicon had been crossed, and the United States was committed to war in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, in Saigon, suggested that the US bomb North Vietnam, and the JCS agreed it was a good idea. They proposed that the Americans adopt a provocative strategy; in other words, force the North to do something that would create the reason for retaliation.
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<p>The Congress, with minimum debate, passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on 7 August, giving President Johnson almost carte blanche to take the country into the war. Two Martin B-57 squadrons moved from Clark Air Base in the Philippines to Bien Hoa AB, and North American F-100 fighters and Convair F-102 interceptors were sent to Da Nang. Other aircraft deployed to Thailand, taking up battle stations. They did not have long to wait. In October, the Johnson administration decided that it would be appropriate to strike against the Ho Chi Minh trail that was being used to infiltrate men and supplies into the south.
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<p>The Viet Cong struck back; they attacked the Bi Hoa base, destroying several aircraft with well-placed mortar fire. Ambassador Taylor again urged bombing of the North, and an inter-agency working group came up with a trio of options for Johnson to consider. First, they suggested, he could order reprisal air strikes and increase the covert operations. Second, he might order bombing of the North until the US got its way. Then he might begin a graduated air war to be followed by the possible deployment of ground troops.
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<p>In December 1964, Johnson made his choice. He wanted to work the first option for 30 days, to be followed by the third if after a month things had not begun to go the way he wanted them to go.
